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29 November 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Current Intelligence Review for
November 1974

1. During my review of the NID, the NIB, and the DIN for November, I covered 33 items that fell within my area of interest. My analysis of these reveals the following:

The NIB carried the largest number--14, the NID was second most prolific--11, and the DINs covered only 8.

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As to the utility of the pieces for National level consumption, only two items (one each from the NID and the DIN) were considered of major value; 19 items (8 NID, 8 NIB, and 3 DIN) were considered as marginally worth reporting; and 12 (2 NID, 6 NIB, and 4 DIN) were rated as fillers.

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In their relationship to KIQs, only two (both DINs) were of major value, 19 (6 NID, 9 NIB, and 4 DIN) had slight peripheral impact, and 12 (5 NID, 5 NIB, 2 DIN) had no relationship.

Of the total of 33 items, 23 concerned the USSR, 9 China, and 1 was devoted to a Soviet surface-to-air missile system in East Germany.

Of the 23 items on the USSR, 8 were mere reportorials on ICBM test firings. This type

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✓ of data has, in my opinion, little if any utility at the National level. It is of primary interest to analysts who probably already have the data anyway.

✓ All of the items had to do with military matters and most of them would be of some interest at the Unified and Specified command level and below.

✓ The NIB and the NID stood, in most instances, head and shoulders above the DINs in their clarity, the amount of analysis, continuity, etc. The NID also outshone the NIB somewhat, especially in pieces containing in-depth analysis.

✓ One criticism that can be directed at all three publications is the lack of continuity in many instances. While I have said that I don't feel that day-to-day reporting on ICBM tests is particularly useful, it would at least be better if significant highlights of a test could be set forth. For example, most consumers are interested in how the MIRV programs are coming along, and the rush to report a test without waiting to get information on whether or not MIRVs were involved leaves the reader with either a feeling of frustration or of ho-hum.

2. It is probably too early in the exercise to make any firm judgments, but if this month proves to be typical, I believe that we will have a strong case for recommending some alteration in the current intelligence procedures and functions.

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Attachment:
Work Sheet

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PR #502

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. Boyatt, ladies and gentlemen:

We meet here on a somber occasion which reminds us that the most important word is the word "Service" when we talk of the Foreign Service.

We think here not only of what our friends have accomplished who are no longer with us but what they attempted to do. Most of our work is mundane and ordinary. And in the day-to-day business of diplomacy we forget that -- we sometimes forget -- that what we are really here for is to build and to preserve the peace. No generation has had a more noble and a more important task because no generation has faced the risks of ours or has confronted a world in such turmoil, with such suffering, and with such opportunity for lasting change.

I did not know all of those whom we honor today, but I worked with some of them. And, therefore, we are not dealing with statistics but with a human experience. And all of us have been associated -- all of us here have been associated with all of the men involved. They went to posts in which they knew that their mission was to help bring the peace or to alleviate suffering but where they might become the symbol for hatred or the object of a blind retribution. But they went and did their duty. And in so doing they enabled all of us and reminded us that nothing is more important than to bring about a world in which such sacrifices will no longer be necessary and in which our officers can serve abroad under conditions that would fulfill the hopes and aspirations of those who gave their lives and of their families.

So we think of them with pride and affection and as an inspiration to the best in the Foreign Service.

Thank you.

* * * * *

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A-8769

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November 18, 1974

No. 502



REMARKS BY
MR. THOMAS BOYATT
PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
AND THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE FOREIGN SERVICE DAY MEMORIAL CEREMONIES
HONORING FOREIGN SERVICE DEAD
NOVEMBER 15, 1974

MR. BOYATT:

Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

In 1933 the American Foreign Service Association established a memorial plaque to commemorate those of our colleagues losing their lives under tragic, heroic, or otherwise inspirational circumstances in the service of this country abroad.

The first name on that list, William Palfrey, dates from 1780. In the two centuries which have elapsed since then 110 names have been added, 35 in the last decade, 10 in the last two years. And today it is our sad duty and our privilege to honor 11 additional colleagues whose names are on the plaque today.

Those colleagues are:

Everett D. Reese, AID, killed in 1965 in Viet-Nam when the plane he was riding in was shot down.

Thomas Ragsdale, Department of Agriculture, serving with AID, captured in 1968 during the Tet offensive. His body was found after the cease-fire.

Donald V. Freeman, AID, killed in 1967 by Vietnamese machine gun fire.

Albert A. Farkas, AID, killed by sniper fire in the Vinh Long area in 1968.

Robert W. Brown, Jr., Department of Defense, serving with AID, killed by the Viet Cong in 1968.

Robert W. Brown, Jr., Department of Defense, serving with AID, killed in Hue in 1968.
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Rudolph Kaiser, AID, died in a Viet Cong ambush in the Mekong Delta in 1972.

John Paul Vann, Associate Director for AID, killed in a helicopter in a night battle in Kontum in 1972.

John S. Patterson, Vice Consul to Hermosillo, Mexico, slain in 1974 while being held captive by kidnappers.

Rodger P. Davies, Ambassador to Cyprus, struck down by sniper fire in Nicosia during a mob attack this year on the American Embassy.

We all know what these terrible losses mean. Our colleagues involved lost their lives. The families lost loved ones. We lost friends. And this nation lost dedicated, effective, and brave public servants.

Earlier this year, in a public forum in New York City, former Secretary Dean Rusk said the following: "The gallantry of the Foreign Service in posts of danger and hardship is deeply moving if seldom recorded." Well, we are here today to make such a record. And we call upon our fellow citizens in the Congress and the public at large to bear witness to the professionalism and dedication of Foreign Service people in life. And let us never forget that even as we talk hundreds, and maybe thousands, of our colleagues are overseas facing assassins bullets, kidnappings, hijacking, mob action, or deadly disease, as well as their courage and sacrifice and death.

We invited President Ford to be at this ceremony today, and he very much wanted to be here, but his duties would not permit it. He has asked me to read the following message to you:

"I send my warmest greetings to all who participate in this special ceremony at the Department of State to pay tribute to eleven Foreign Service members who lost their lives abroad in service to their country. These men whose names have been added to the memorial plaque maintained by the American Foreign Service Association will be part of an honored rostrum of heroism spanning almost two centuries, from William Palfrey in 1780 to Ambassador Rodger Davies in 1974. These dedicated Foreign Service personnel will always be an inspiring example of courage and devotion.

"This occasion also gives me an opportunity to express our nation's appreciation to the men and women of our Foreign Service for their selfless dedication both at home and abroad in helping to guarantee world peace and the future well-being of our country. Gerald R. Ford, President."

I would now like to call on Secretary Kissinger, who also has a message for us.

Secretary Kissinger.

institutionalized foreign policy.

But I thought I might talk to you about what the necessities are as I see them and what I think the contribution is that the Foreign Service can make.

We are going through one of the greatest changes in the position of the United States in the world that has ever occurred in our history. When we conducted foreign policy in the aftermath of World War II during a period of extraordinary creativity, we subconsciously drew on our domestic experience. What we did internationally was really to implement the New Deal experience of at home. We believed that stability would result more or less automatically from closing the gap between expectations and reality. We were working with democratic governments of similar traditions, and we were carrying out values which had been built into our society so much that they came to be taken for granted.

I believe that the decade after World War II was, without doubt, one of the most creative in American foreign policy. But it is also clear that in the 1970's we are living in a much more complicated period. The old assumptions of implacable hostility of a unified, monolithic communist bloc threatening the so-called free peoples has disappeared.

The self-assurance with which we thought we could reform the

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governments of all the peoples of the world has also been shaken, for a variety of reasons, including a very searing domestic experience. The problem of security which was hidden by the fact of the atomic monopoly has appeared to the United States for the first time in its history in the manner in which other less favored nations had to deal with it throughout most of their experience. And so we face the tension between the requirements of security and the imperative of our value between the evolution of societies of different values and the necessity that they will not be accepted unless it is based on some principle of justice that people can share.

We have to build this new structure in such a way that the act of construction doesn't make everything tumble down. I do not now want to go into a long analysis of the nature of our foreign policy. I make this point about the revolutionary change in the nature of our foreign policy to indicate the responsibilities that I believe the Foreign Service must carry over the years ahead.

During my first years in Washington there was a great deal of debate about the relative influence of the White House as against the State Department. And it is a

PRINCE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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November 11, 1974

No. 494



REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE SEVENTH ANNUAL AWARDS PRESENTATION
OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
NOVEMBER 11, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Tom, distinguished guests,
I appreciate this introduction. I think you were somewhat too modest. There are many junior Foreign Service Officers who have managed to discomfit me. (Laughter) I, of course, realize that I am working under a certain handicap in this building, the primary one being that the majority of the Foreign Service Officers are convinced that I could never be working in this building unless I were in my present position. (Laughter) And, therefore, they try to spare me the operational details of my job. They let me make decisions about the plans for the Year 2000 and the plumbing in the basement, but there is a grey area in between which I seem to have trouble reaching.

I have been here for a year now, and I'm beginning to understand the system. For example, a few months ago I was supposed to call a certain Senator on a subject of not overwhelming difficulty, which was embodied in a memorandum having eight endorsements. But lest I miss the point -- which was thought highly probable (Laughter) -- some of the drafters

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of this memorandum called the Senator and told him what I was going to say. (Laughter) And it's a system that works extraordinarily well; it's a form of psychological warfare.

The other day there was a Senator that I was supposed to call who had already received four phone calls during the day from junior Foreign Service Officers about what I was going to say to him, and told to stand by for my phone call, which never came. I met him at dinner that evening, and he was willing to concede anything if I had only known what it was that I was supposed to say to him.

(Laughter)

The memorandum caught up with me the next morning.

I expressed my views on that subject to my dedicated associates, and now I don't get memoranda any more that show the number of endorsements. (Laughter) I dare not hope that the number of endorsements has actually declined, but I am in blissful ignorance about it.

I wanted to make a few remarks about the conduct of foreign policy as I see it at this moment and the role of the Foreign Service in relation to it. We've read a great deal about institutionalizing foreign policy, which, as I understand it, means that whenever I do something that somebody doesn't like it is obvious that I haven't

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debate that is not new. But it is a debate that really should never take place because I believe that if this building does its job any President must want to use it. And, therefore, the question is, what is the job this building is supposed to do. What is it that is required in the present period?

First, let me say that, having worked with the Foreign Service for a year, there is no doubt in my mind that there is no group more dedicated, more able, and more knowledgeable in any department in the Government. On the contrary, I don't know any department in the Government that has as dedicated and able a group of people. But the demands on the Foreign Service have changed.

In earlier periods in which the framework was more settled, a great emphasis could be put on reporting and the accurate rendition of conversations that are held by various Officers in the field. Today -- at least as far as I am concerned -- reporting is, of course, important, but what we need more than anything is analysis. The description of a conversation with somebody that the senior people have never heard of is almost totally irrelevant or extremely confusing.

Now, in those parts of the world in which I know the chief actors it is quite sufficient. But you cannot count on the fact that there will be a Secretary of State or a President who knows the chief actors. And, therefore, if you want to help the Seventh floor, it is absolutely imperative not just to report what people say but to explain what people mean, not just to describe how a situation looks but to try to lay out what the trends are, what can be expected, and to do so not on the basis of some sentimental proclivities but on the basis of a hard-headed -- if necessary, cold-blooded -- analysis of what the various alternatives are that the situation requires.

Now, I must say candidly that in this respect we are not doing as well as we can, not nearly as well as our capabilities would permit us to. And when I speak of institutionalization of foreign policy, what I would like to see, leave behind, is that when a problem reaches this Department automatically the various bureaus take hold of it in a manner that shapes it in relation to foreseeable purposes of real alternatives and predictable consequences.

I have been a veteran of the options process. And I have tended to insist on being given choices in which

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the country directors and the assistant secretaries have a sense of where they think the nation ought to go, that they can defend that sense, that if they have a different view from the Seventh Floor or from the White House that they possess the intellectual discipline to present it and to put up a tough fight before they yield if another decision is made. I believe we have the makings of it in this Department, and if I can leave this behind I would consider it a much more significant achievement than the negotiations that come and go, and every success of which just creates a new set of problems.

This is why I am delighted that Tom has asked me to be here at the Awards Ceremony, some of which, as I understand it, are being given for dissenting from established points of view, for which we bear no visible grudges.

(Laughter) But you will notice that I'm not reading the citations. (Laughter) But I think it is right that awards are given for dissent. I think that a self-confident Service must be a Service in which dissent is encouraged.

It should be dissent that is kept within the Service, and once a decision is made it is carried out with a discipline which is, I believe, characteristic of the Service.

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But I have enjoyed working with Tom. I have enjoyed working with the Foreign Service Officers. And I think they are getting used to my administrative practice in which the highest attainable praise is the absence of criticism. (Laughter)

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

* * * * *

lately the Department has developed a higher degree of skill than before. For the first four years of my presence in Washington, if I picked Option 2 I was right 98 percent of the time, because there was Option 2, which was the preferred option; there was Option 1, which was Option 2 minus a little bit; and then there was Option 3, which was Option 2 plus a little bit. But I attended a meeting this morning where the preferred option was always Option 3, so now I'm in a state of extreme confusion, and you mustn't do this to me. (laughter)

But when we speak about options, what I have in mind is some real options, and not a party line developed in the bureau after which all the considerable ingenuity of the Service is put to work to make that view prevail. I think if the view is correct it can survive being put in the form of alternatives. And I think if some people are willing to play the role of Devil's advocate the preferred view will gain in strength.

I think this is all the more essential because, as we go ahead into the future, we will face more and more confusing situations and there will be an overwhelming temptation to let one's self be driven by the emotion of the moment. But the difference between observers and actors

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is that the actors who are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy do not have the right to let themselves be driven by emotions. They are responsible not only for the best thing that can happen but also for the consequences of failure. They are not conducting foreign policy in order to implement their personal preference, but to carry out the national interest in relation to the global interest. And they have to keep in mind that it isn't self-gratification that brought them into the Foreign Service but precisely the notion of service.

Now, I believe that all over the world there are many -- there are hundreds -- who live by these principles. And I believe that without the Foreign Service we will not be able to create a consistent foreign policy. We cannot base foreign policy on star performers. We cannot rely that somebody will come along every few years to manipulate events. What we need is a high average standard of performance that is carried over through the decades. And that cannot be done by any President or by any Secretary of State. That is what I mean by institutionalization of foreign policy.

I don't mean that every country director attends every meeting in the Secretary's office. But I do mean that

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at: Mr. Ernst
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SUBJECT : Secretary's Remarks on the Foreign Service

REF :

Attached as Enclosure No. 1 is the text of remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at the AFSA Awards Luncheon held in the Department on November 11, on the institutionalization of foreign policy and the role of the Foreign Service.

Attached as Enclosure No. 2 is the text of remarks made by the Secretary and by Mr. Thomas Boyatt, President of AFSA, at ceremonies on Foreign Service Day, November 15, honoring eleven members of the Foreign Service whose names were added to the plaque commemorating Service members who lost their lives abroad in tragic, heroic or otherwise inspirational circumstances. In the course of his remarks the Secretary also read a commemorative message from the President.

These texts should be made available to all officers.

INCERSOLL, ACTING

Enclosures:

1. Text of Remarks Made by Secretary Kissinger at AFSA Awards Luncheon
2. Text of Remarks Made by the Secretary and Mr. Thomas Boyatt, President of AFSA at Ceremonies on Foreign Service Day

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Remarks:

Dick and Bill:

pp 5 and 7 are particularly interesting.

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